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The debate over Sunday shopping in Nova Scotia, Canada’s last bastion of Sunday 
closing laws, has polarized the province during the last half-decade.  Traditionalists 
supported the status quo for, inter alia, religious reasons,1 to reject consumerism,2 or 
to protect workers.3  These individuals were pitted against business groups,4 who 
favoured a market-based approach to determining retail hours; and some citizens, 
who desired greater consumer choice.5  
 
It not often that a curt first-instance decision on an application challenging the va-
lidity of an order-in-council might warrant the attention of a case comment.  Nev-








General)6, which ultimately led to the end of the enforcement of Sunday closing 
legislation in Nova Scotia, is one such instance.  Despite the court’s narrow hold-
ing – that the Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act7 did not give the provincial 
cabinet the authority to craft regulations that prevented retail operations beyond a 
certain size from opening8 – the government publicly responded by permitting all 
stores to open on Sundays and statutory holidays.9  Subsequently, cabinet effected 
this response through an order-in-council excluding all retail operations from the 
ambit of the act.10  
1  See e.g. “On the seventh day, Nova Scotians will ... shop” Edmonton Journal (17 November 2003), 
A2 (noting that religious leaders have opposed Sunday shopping because it would diminish the 
time that families are able to spend together).
2  See e.g. Mark Parent “Meaning of life: Never on a Sunday” The Globe and Mail (26 October 2004), 
A21 (“Unregulated Sunday shopping removes the symbolic bulwark of Sunday as a visible and 
recurring reminder that there are more important things in life than endless consumer consump-
tion”).
3  See e.g. John Jacobs, “Seven-day Shopping Won’t Cure What Ails Us” (15 October 2004), online: 
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increase pressures for broader array of services and businesses to operate 7 days a week and it will 
result [in] longer and more fragmented workweeks”).
4  See e.g. “Spokesman for archbishop speaks out on Sunday shopping in Nova Scotia” Canadian 
Press (16 October 2003) (quoting a spokesperson for the Halifax Chamber of Commerce who ar-
gued that “[i]ndependent businesses must have the right to open as the market dictates…[w]e 
should deregulate shopping hours if we are to be a truly competitive province.’’).  
5  See e.g. Shawna Richer “Sunday may never be the same” The Globe and Mail (2 October 2004), 
F3 (quoting a small-business owner who noted “Sunday doesn’t need to be a day that everything 
is closed…[w]e just want to the choice to be there and government should not be regulating hours. 
It doesn’t make sense.”).  
6  (2006) 248 N.S.R. (2d) 149 (S.C.) [Sobeys].  The decision was delivered on 4 October 2006.
7  R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 402.  Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the “act”, infra, refer to the 
Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act.

























March 2006) [News Release, “Province to Remove Restrictions to Sunday Shopping”].





























This comment will first provide a contextual backdrop for the decision in Sobeys, 
followed by a discussion of the court’s holding.  It will then review the government’s 
response to the decision, and evaluate its implied claim that the court required the 
government to lift its prohibition on Sunday store openings.  A discussion of the 
legislative-judicial dialogue, and its impact on political discourse, follows.  The 
comment contends that while the province’s response to Sobeys was a victory for 
consumer and retailer choice while eliminating a regulatory anachronism, it is nev-
ertheless symptomatic of the willingness of legislators in the era of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms11 to rely on judicial pronouncements as a reason to avoid mak-
ing decisions on divisive public policy matters – even in instances where constitu-











Until October 2006, Nova Scotia remained the only jurisdiction in Canada that pro-
hibited the closure of most retail operations on Sundays throughout the year.12  The 
following section includes a brief history of the Sunday closing debate in Nova 
Scotia, which culminated in the successful challenge in Sobeys.13
In 1985, filling the legislative lacuna which resulted from the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s invalidation of the Lord’s Day Act in Big M,14 Nova Scotia enacted secu-
lar Sunday closing legislation, which became known as the Retail Business Uniform 
Closing Days Act.15  While the legislation originally permitted municipalities to set 
hours of business, the province soon after decided to begin regulating retail hours 
province-wide.16
The act requires that most retail operations close on Sundays, as well as sev-
eral enumerated statutory holidays.17  Nevertheless, several exemptions from 
services to which Section 3 of the Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act does not apply”.  The act 
and its regulations are discussed in greater detail infra.
11  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
12  Prince Edward Island, however, continues to permit Sunday shopping only during the Christ-
mas season, though several classes of retail stores are exempted from the operation of the act.  See 
Retail Business Holidays Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. R-13.02.  
13  The Supreme Court of Canada’s seminal decision in R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 
[Big M] was at least partly responsible for the liberalization of Canadian Sunday closing laws over 
the last two decades, and resulted in the reorientation of such statutes towards secular objectives. 
















section 2(a) of the Charter.  While provinces which had not done so subsequently enacted secular 
Sunday closing legislation, many of these restrictions were eventually relaxed and eliminated.  For 



























    al.” (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 724 at 726-730.  For an early comparative perspec-
tive on Sunday closing laws in Canada and the United States, see Jerome Barron, “Sunday in North 
America” (1965) 79 Harv. L. Rev. 42.
14  Big M, ibid.
15  See Sobeys, supra note 6 at paras. 5-6. 
16  Ibid. at para. 7.






















admit the public to any premises where a retail business is carried on except as otherwise provided 
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the operation of the act exist in the legislation for, inter alia, retailers of cer-
tain agricultural products, restaurants, and pharmacies.18  Regulations made 
pursuant to the act also included additional exemptions; notably, one regu-
lation excluded grocery stores smaller than 4000 square feet from the act. 
While the latter regulation still prevented large grocery stores and other retail op-
erations from opening, one grocer, Pete’s Frootique, famously circumvented the 
size restrictions by dividing its large grocery and produce operation into separately 
incorporated businesses, each one of which did not exceed the 4000 square foot 
limitation.  In 1999, charges were eventually laid against this retailer for allegedly 
violating the act.  However, in R. v. Pete’s Frootique,19 an acquittal was entered.  In 
obiter, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil and consider each of the busi-
nesses – which shared corporate officers – as one operation for the purposes of the 
act.20  The court further approved of the novel structuring of the businesses, indicat-
ing that it could 

















way they wish and at the same time meet the strictly construed requirements 
of the legislation.21
Despite the decision in Pete’s Frootique, major retailers did not immediately adopt 
similar corporate structures, and Pete’s Frootique operated as an anomaly.  
With the election of a minority Progressive Conservative government in 2003, Sun-
day shopping became a significant political issue, as each of the three parties in the 
provincial legislature advanced different positions on whether or not the Sunday 
closing law should be liberalized.  The government decided to address the issue by 
permitting stores to open on the six Sundays prior to Christmas in 2003,22 as well as 
by conducting a plebiscite alongside municipal elections in October 2004 in order 
to determine public support for Sunday shopping.
The plebiscite provided electors two choices – the first between year-round Sunday 
shopping and none at all.  Electors could also choose whether they desired Sunday 
shopping throughout the year, or only in the weeks preceding Christmas.23  In the 
end, the electorate voted to maintain the status quo.24  Notwithstanding the result 
of the plebiscite, Sunday shopping continued to be the subject of public debate; in 
2006 the Progressive Conservative Party promised another plebiscite on the matter, 
which it proposed to hold in 2008.25
in this Act.”
18  Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act, s. 2.
19  [1999] N.S.J. No. 357 (QL) [Pete’s Frootique].
20  Ibid. at paras. 10-13.
21  Ibid. at para. 11.
22  The act was amended to permit pre-Christmas Sunday Shopping in 2003:  see Retail Business 
Uniform Closing Day Act, s. 3A.




24  See “Nova Scotians refuse Sunday shopping” The Globe and Mail (18 October 2004), A8.
25  See “Premier opens door to Sunday shopping vote” CBC News (11 May 2006) online:  CBC 
News
     h p://www.cbc.ca/canada/nova-­‐‑scotia/story/2006/05/11/nsv-­‐‑sundayshopping20060511.html
    
(accessed 18 March 2007).
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However, in the summer of 2006, Nova Scotia’s two largest grocery retailers – So-
beys and Atlantic Superstore – began to open selected locations on Sundays by in-
corporating separate departments within their stores, comparable to the corporate 
structure which Pete’s Frootique successfully adopted years earlier.  In response, 
the government attempted to give effect to the results of the plebiscite, and passed 
new regulations which continued to prohibit the opening of stores larger than 4000 
square feet, and also provided that separately incorporated businesses owned by 
“related persons” which were in close proximity or within the same building would 
be considered one business for the purposes of the act.26  Interestingly, the new reg-
ulations grandfathered stores which had operated on Sundays prior to 1 June 2006 
(such as Pete’s Frootique).  It was these regulations that Sobeys Group challenged;27 







Unlike most challenges to Sunday closing laws since Big M – many of which have 
been based on purported violations of the Charter – in Sobeys, the applicant simply 
sought a declaration that cabinet did not have the statutory authority to enact the 
June 2006 regulations.  The applicant also contended that the regulations were dis-
criminatory as against it and other large retailers. 28  
The court’s analysis focused on statutory interpretation, and in particular, the regu-
lation-making authority delegated to cabinet under the Retail Business Uniform Clos-
ing Day Act.  Specifically, the act permits the cabinet to create regulations:
 (a) defining a word or expression used in this Act and not defined herein;
 (b) determining or modifying the meaning of a clause of subsection 
 (2) of Section 3;
 (ba) permitting a retail business to operate on Sunday between one 
 o’clock in the afternoon and six o’clock in the afternoon in order to 
 implement the result of the plebiscite held pursuant to Section 10;













3(1) The goods and services provided by a retail business in any of the following categories are pre-
scribed as goods and services to which Section 3 of the Act [the provision prohibiting the opening 
of retail operations on uniform closing days] does not apply:
(a) a store















(2) For the purposes of clause 1(a), 2 or more stores that are owned, occupied or operated by related 
persons are deemed to be one store if they are (a) in the same building; or (b) adjacent or in close 
proximity to each other.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “related persons” has the same meaning as in the Income Tax 
Act (Canada).
(4) Subsection (2) does not apply to a store if that store was regularly open to the public on Sunday 
before June 1, 2006 [parentheses added].
27  Atlantic Superstore appeared as an intervenor at the hearing of the application in Sobeys.
28  Sobeys, supra note 6 at para. 4.  Sobeys also argued that the regulation was invalid because it 
was enacted with an improper purpose and amounted to an exercise of bad faith on cabinet’s part. 
The court declined to address this argument.  See at para. 38.
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 (c) respecting any matter necessary or advisable to carry out effectively 
 the intent and purpose of this Act.29
Reviewing the rules of statutory interpretation, Richard J. highlighted the impor-
tance of the lack of subjective language in the regulation-making authority which 
section 8(c) of the act conferred:
It appears from this analysis that had the Minister or Cabinet (the regulat-
















question such decision. In the absence of such a subjective authority it is open 
to the Courts to objectively review the challenged regulations to determine if 
they were made under the authority of the Act. 30
Richard J. then rejected the respondent Attorney General’s contention that the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.31 – in 
which the court held that it was constitutionally acceptable for the provinces to 
enact secular Sunday closing legislation if they wished – was of any assistance in 
determining whether the impugned regulations were valid.32  His Lordship also 
rejected a related argument in which the respondent contended that since Nova 
Scotia’s Sunday closing legislation was modelled on Ontario’s legislation (the valid-
ity of which was generally affirmed in Edwards Books), the court should thus uphold 
the impugned regulation.33
The court ultimately found that the impugned regulations were ultra vires, holding 
that, objectively, the enabling provisions of the act did not provide cabinet with 
either the express or implied authority to enact regulations concerning whether 
retailers of a certain size would be exempt from the act, or ones which concerned 
retailers’ respective corporate structures.34


















again, what this application is NOT about. It is not about any social or politi-
cal considerations respecting the appropriateness of Sunday shopping; nor 
is it about the constitutional authority of the legislature to enact legislation 
dealing with Sunday shopping; nor is it about the protection of vulnerable 
retail employees being required to work on Sundays. This application is sim-
29  Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act, s. 8 [Emphasis added, capitalization and parentheses 
in original].
30  Sobeys, supra note 6 at para. 18 [Emphasis added, italics and parenthesis in original].
31  [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [Edwards Books].
32  Sobeys, supra note 6 at paras. 25-26.
33  See generally ibid. at paras. 19-26.




















or purpose, one can surmise because of the grandfather provision and the focus on retailers over a 
certain size, that the regulation was not necessary to carry out the purpose of the act – which was 
to restrict the opening of retail operations on Sundays and holidays.  Nevertheless, the court also 
found that the regulation was ultra vires insofar as it discriminated against the applicant Sobeys 
Group and others not falling within the scope of the regulation.  See ibid. at para. 37.
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ply about the scope of the authority or power granted to the Governor in 
Council (Cabinet) to make regulations pursuant to the Act. 35 
It is perhaps ironic that the court’s decision in Sobeys – one of the more restrictive 
and narrow holdings in two decades of Canadian Sunday closing jurisprudence 
– resulted in a legislative response that went well beyond what the court would 
have required.36  
Immediately following the decision, Premier Rodney MacDonald announced that 
all retail stores would be permitted to open on Sundays.37  This was despite the fact 
that the regulation-making authority conferred upon cabinet was not invalidated. 
Days later, this intent was effected through an order-in-council.38  However, the 
Premier’s pronouncement went further, as his decision to permit stores to open 
was not limited to Sundays, but included all statutory holidays under the act.  This 
made Remembrance Day, a holiday which a separate statute governs,39 the only day 
when stores and other businesses would be required by law to close.  
The opposition parties were critical of the government’s volte-face.  New Demo-
cratic Party Leader Darrell Dexter noted that “[t]his is a case of the premier acting 
extraordinarily impulsively, deciding to extend what was a very limited court deci-
sion to statutory holidays, which will inevitably affect far more people than was 
anticipated.’’40  Interim Liberal Leader Michel Samson objected to what he viewed 




By arguing that “the court’s ruling was clear”, as one government website con-
tends,42 the provincial government, at least impliedly, claimed that it had no choice 
35  Ibid. at para. 34 [Emphasis added; capitalization and parentheses in original].  The language 
which Richard J. adopted in this part of the decision mirrors almost identically the oral submis-
sions of the applicant Sobeys Group: “what this application is about is not about social or political 
considerations. It’s not about the appropriateness of Sunday shopping, nor is it about the power 
of the legislature to pass an Act dealing with Sunday shopping. This case, this application is about 
one fact and it is about the scope of the Cabinet’s power to pass Regulations pursuant to the Act”. 
See ibid. note 6 at para. 1.
36  This is especially so considering that the court and the parties before it acknowledged that the 
province has the constitutional ability to enact Sunday closing legislation.  See ibid. at paras. 2, 5, 
& 25.
37  News Release, “Province to Remove Restrictions to Sunday Shopping”, supra note 9.
38  Supra note 10.  The legislature has not amended the act to broaden or change the scope of the 
cabinet’s regulatory authority under the act since the decision in Sobeys was rendered.  It is thus 
questionable whether the new regulation which exempts all retail operations from the act might 
not be itself ultra vires, following the reasoning in Sobeys, as one could argue that such a regulation 
is neither “necessary” nor “advisable” to advance the purpose of the act.    
39  Remembrance Day Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 396.
40  “N.S. premier defends decision to allow stores to open on holidays” Canadian Press (11 October 
2006).
41  “Decision to end Sunday shopping ban in N.S. not valid – opposition” Canadian Press (12 
October 2006).
42  Nova Scotia, Department of Finance, Sunday Shopping Information,
     online:














have meant all grocery stores could open.”).  The decision, of course, held that the province did not 
have the regulatory authority to prevent certain grocery stores from opening on the basis of their 
size.  The court did not pronounce upon the government’s ability to prohibit all grocery stores from 
opening; in fact, the authority for such a proposition is found directly in the text of the act.
Sobeys Group Inc. v. Nova Scotia
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but to permit Sunday shopping on account of the decision in Sobeys.  As this com-
ment has discussed, the cabinet’s decision to effectively end the enforcement of the 
act went well beyond what the court in its decision.  Notably, it appears that the 
government could have actually further restricted the ability of stores to open on 
Sundays (and arguably give effect to the spirit, if not the letter, of the electorate’s 
decision in the 2004 plebiscite) provided it did not exempt operations based on size 
and, therefore, not permit any retail stores (aside from those already exempted un-
der the act) to open on Sundays.  
The government’s reaction, alongside the holding in Sobeys, provide an opportu-
nity to explore the scope and state of dialogue between the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government and the judiciary.  Given the limited space that a case 
comment presents, the objective of this section is not to engage in either a full-scale 
survey of the development of the dialogue metaphor43 or the expansive corpus 
of literature and jurisprudence which has discussed it.  Nevertheless, Sobeys is a 
unique instance of failed dialogue outside of the constitutional context, on which 






While the notion that judicial review can be “dialogic” is not new, the first expansive 
account of the dialogue metaphor in the Canadian context was contained in an ar-
ticle which Hogg and Bushell penned in 1997. 44  In their analysis of judicial review 
under the Charter, they contended that the relationship between the legislature and 
the judiciary in the resolution of a constitutional issue is dialogic in instances where 
judicial decisions are open to a legislative response.45  Hogg and Bushell ultimately 
see judicial review as the start of a dialogue on how to reconcile the values of the 
Charter with the economic and social policies which the legislature enacts,46 as op-
posed to being a final pronouncement upon the propriety of state action.  Hogg and 
Bushell find that a legislative-judicial dialogic relationship exists where “a decision 
is open to legislative reversal, modification, or avoidance”.47  
Many proponents of dialogue argue that the ensuing discourse between the courts 
and the legislature can be democracy-enhancing, “by requiring legislatures clearly 
43  The phrases “dialogue metaphor” and “dialogue theory” are used interchangeably in this 
comment.
44  Peter W. Hogg & Alison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” 
(1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L. J. 75 [Hogg & Bushell].  The Supreme Court of Canada has spoken ap-
provingly of the dialogue metaphor:  see e.g. Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, Iacobucci J. at 





















    The Least Dangerous Branch:  The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1986).  Hogg and Bushell’s conclusions are 
critiqued in Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, “Six Degrees of Dialogue:  A Response to 
Hogg and Bushell” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L. J. 513.
45  Hogg & Bushell, ibid. at 79.
46  Ibid. at 105.
47  Ibid. at 79.  See also Kent Roach, “Dialogic Judicial Review and Its Critics” (2004) 23 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 49 at 57.  Those advancing a theory of dialogue with reference to the Charter, such as Roach, 
rely on both the ability of the state to justify limits on rights under section 1 of the Charter, as well 
as the potential to invoke the notwithstanding clause, as tools which the legislature can use to re-
spond to instances where courts have invalidated legislation or state action.
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to articulate, justify and be held accountable for their decisions to limit or depart 
from the constitutional or common law principles articulated by the Court”.48  There 
are some, however, who are critical of both the metaphor and its ability to promote 
democracy, questioning whether it is an accurate description of the interaction be-
tween courts and the legislatures.  Morton, for example, argues that the discussion 
between the judiciary and the legislature that the Charter heralded is really just a 
court-initiated monologue, “with judges doing most of the talking and legislatures 
most of the listening”.49  Waldron is much more scathing in his indictment of the 
notion of dialogic judicial review:
…for I suspect that many who talk about ‘dialogue’ between courts and leg-
islatures really have in mind a sort of one-sided monologue, in the course 
of which the legislature would be expected to change its position in light of 
the occasional lectures and reprimands it receives from the judiciary, but in 















they hear from the legislature as the height of impudence.50
The dialogue metaphor is not, however, limited to the constitutional context – 
though this has attracted the attention of many Canadian scholars partly because 
sections 1 and 33 of the Charter provide overt and blunt mechanisms through which 
the legislature can contribute to dialogue.  Drawing upon the work of Willis, Roach 
notes that legislative-judicial dialogue in Canada pre-dates the Charter, and was 
manifest most notably in instances of the presumptions of statutory interpretation, 51 











While legislatures have always been able to refrain from participating in dialogue 
with the courts, the Charter era has arguably made such instances far more perva-
sive, if only because the courts have been equipped with a more robust version of 
judicial review than that which existed prior to 1982 – thereby providing more op-
portunities for dialogic engagement.
48  Kent Roach, “Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues between the Supreme Court and 
Canadian Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481 at 484 [Roach, “Constitutional and Common 
Law Dialogues”].  A recent discussion of the democracy-enhancing character of judicial review 






















violated the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms – promotes democracy by reinvigorating 
public debate about Canada’s single-tier health care system).




    The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough:  Broadview Press, 
2000) at 166: “what Hogg and [Bushell] describe as a dialogue is usually a monologue, with judges 
doing most of the talking and legislatures most of the listening”.
50  Jeremy Waldron, “Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislatures” (2004) 23 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 7 at 7-8.  See also Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” 
(2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346.
51  Roach, “Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues”, supra note 48 at 508-509:  “The common 
law presumptions can facilitate a constructive dialogue between courts and legislatures not only 
about fundamental values that might otherwise be neglected in the legislative process”.  Roach 
cites the examples, inter alia, of the presumption of mens rea in the criminal context and the pre-
sumption against expropriation without compensation.  See ibid. at 503-504.
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The Nova Scotia government’s reaction to Sobeys can be seen as part of a trend 
where legislatures place the burden on courts to make difficult policy decisions. 
This “legislative abdication”52 can be viewed as a failure of dialogue, not because of 
the limited ability of the legislature to respond to a judicial decision (which is more 
likely to occur in a constitutional context given the inherent constraints on legisla-
tive action), but because of the unwillingness of the legislature to engage with the 
courts, in order to inoculate itself from the political fallout of positioning itself on 
one side of a controversial issue.  
Manifested in tepid non-responses to court decisions such as Sobeys, legislative ab-
dication has the unfortunate consequence of undermining the democracy-enhanc-
ing nature of dialogic judicial review.53  It can also result in the courts becoming the 
object of criticism from those who are dissatisfied with the finality of its decisions, 
undermining public confidence in the judiciary.54
Hiebert cautions against over-reliance on the judiciary to solve policy disputes:











tutions to renege on their responsibility to make responsible decisions about 
how to reconcile compelling legislative purposes with the values espoused 
in the Charter.55
While her analysis is concerned with judicial review on constitutional grounds, 
Hiebert’s comments are still apt in the context of Sobeys.  Since the court was only 
confronted with the bare legal question of whether cabinet regulations were ultra 
vires the enabling provisions of the Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act, this al-
lowed Richard J. to, rightly, refrain from considering the impact of Sunday closing 
legislation on other collateral matters, for example, labour relations.56 The legisla-
ture and the cabinet were thus comparatively better placed to assess how to balance 
the positions of those who supported or opposed Sunday closing laws, as well as to 
determine how best to implement the results of its plebiscite, pending the outcome 
of a future vote.
However, for a government like Nova Scotia’s – with a precarious hold on power 
either because of unpopularity or a minority of seats in the legislature – there is 
little incentive to bother responding to a court decision which purports to settle a 


















ambit of the Retail Business Uniform Closing Day Act was a response to judicial invalidation, and 
thus dialogic per se.  However, the decision did not demand that the government stop enforcing the 
statute, which is what the government’s response accomplished through regulation.  Legislative 
abdication occurred through the government’s non-engagement of the court’s decision, rather than 
through non-action.























    The Globe and Mail (5 October 2006), 






















    Role? (Montreal:  McGill-Queen’s Univer-
sity Press, 2002) at 218.
56  See especially Sobeys, supra note 6 at para. 33.
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lative lacuna to remain, while publicly stating that the legislature had “no choice” 
but to acquiesce to the court’s decision. 
Such a result is especially ironic in Sobeys, as the legislature had several mecha-
nisms by which it could continue to enforce its legislation, given that the cabinet 
could have enacted new regulations restricting store hours, provided they were 
compliant with the enabling provisions of the statute.  Of course, the government 
could also (or alternatively) have sought to amend the Retail Business Uniform Clos-
ing Day Act to provide even greater latitude to the cabinet to craft regulations under 
the act.  All that was required, according to Richard J.’s discussion of the princi-
ples of statutory interpretation, would be the addition of a subjective element to 
the regulation-making authority of the cabinet under the statute.  In the event ad-
ditional challenges arose, the reasoning of Richard J. suggests that a court would 
show greater deference to the regulations made pursuant to such a subjective grant 
of authority.57  In Sobeys, the court was a willing participant in dialogue – it even 
provided a veritable road map to guide the government if it wished to amend its 
legislation or enact new regulations.  
On the day of the decision, Premier MacDonald acknowledged that Sobeys had the 
effect of ending the ongoing debate concerning Sunday shopping.58  In fact, one 
media outlet reported that the Premier expressed relief that this was the case.59  But 
the notion of dialogue, whether within or outside of the constitutional context, de-
mands a fruitful and continuous discussion about the bounds of state action and 
the need to ensure that it is compliant with norms – be they constitutional, or in the 
case of Sobeys, statutory.  Through legislative abdication, the Nova Scotia govern-
ment lost an opportunity to engage in dialogue, with the absurd result that a statute 
exists in Nova Scotia which prohibits the operation of stores on Sundays, but from 
which all retail operations are exempt.
V.
    CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the unusual end to Nova Scotia’s Sunday closing saga, the gov-
ernment’s decision was a positive one, finally eliminating a retail closing regime 
with which every other province has dispensed, while facilitating consumer and 
retailer choice.  Though some have vowed to continue their fight against Sunday 
shopping,60 it is unclear how successful they have been.
What was, in actuality, an extremely narrow holding invalidating an order-in-coun-
cil resulted in the government refusing to continue to enforce its Sunday closing 
legislation, ironically through the issuance of another order-in-council exempting 
all retail stores from the ambit of the very act designed to restrict the opening hours of 
retail stores.  Whether this was because of a desire of the Nova Scotia government to 
simply and quickly dispose of a divisive political issue in a minority legislature, or 
57  Above note 30 and ibid. at para. 18.
58  James Keller “Supreme Court ruling prompts N.S. premier to eliminate Sunday shopping ban” 




























for government employees to work on weekends.).
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part of a more pervasive trend of governments declining to engage in dialogue with 
the courts in order for the latter to have the last word on contentious public issues, 
is uncertain.  Nevertheless, the fallout from Sobeys is a window into the mind of the 
post-Charter government – where the court’s contribution to dialogue was relied 
upon by the supposed legislative partner in dialogue as the final say.  
Though the Nova Scotia government made the correct policy decision in ending 
the enforcement of its anachronistic Sunday closing regime after Sobeys, it also un-
dermined the dialogue metaphor.  If dialogue failed in Sobeys, it was not because of 
judicial fiat or constitutional straitjacket, but through the simple acquiescence of a 
risk-averse cabinet.  
